This book explores the question of why a significant difference in the frequency and intensity with which Great Britain and Germany used military force since 1990 persists despite reunification and the end of the Cold War. Based on the theoretical framework of moderate constructivism, this thesis argues that differences in strategic culture can explain this puzzle. To this end, it analyses opinion polls and military interventions abroad and then compares decision processes and debates leading to military interventions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan.
Wilhelm Mirow obtained his Master degree in International Relations from the Freie Universität Berlin in January 2008 and spent a semester abroad at Sciences Po Paris after having completed his Bachelor of Science in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2005. He then interned at the United Nations Headquarters Secretariat in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination for six months.